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Andrzej Duda of the opposition Law and Justice party secured a surprise victory in Poland’s
presidential election on 24 May. Aleks Szczerbiak writes on what the election result means for the
country ahead of the more signiﬁcant parliamentary elections due to be held later this year. He
notes that Duda’s success suggests the ruling Civic Platform government can no longer rely on its
previously productive strategy of mobilising reluctant supporters through generating fear of an
opposition victory.
In one of the biggest electoral upsets in post-communist Polish politics, Andrzej Duda – the
candidate of the right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party, the main opposition grouping – pulled oﬀ a stunning victory
in the 24 May presidential election second round run-oﬀ, defeating incumbent Bronisław Komorowski by 51.6 per
cent to 48.5 per cent.
Mr Komorowski, who was backed by the ruling centrist Civic Platform (PO) party led by Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz,
started the campaign with personal and job approval ratings of over 70 per cent and appeared odds-on favourite to
win, possibly even in the ﬁrst round. However, the President saw his poll ratings slide during the course of a weak
and complacent campaign that appeared to be based on the assumption that his popularity would translate
automatically into electoral support.
Mr Komorowski’s core campaign message, based on
the slogan ‘Agreement and Security’, was the claim
that, unlike his opponents, he represented political
consensus and stability. These qualities had, he
argued, ensured that Poland avoided sharp internal
conﬂicts thereby maintaining continuous economic
growth throughout the global ﬁnancial crisis and
underpinning national security at a time when the
international situation in the region was so unstable.
However, Mr Komorowski’s abstract message about
the apparent success of Poland’s post-communist
transition appeared disconnected from the day-to-day
realities of life experienced by many Poles. Even as
the country’s economy has grown, large swathes of
the population beyond the large urban centres have
failed to see an increase in their living standards. In
particular, a large number of young Poles often faced
an invidious choice between moving abroad to take
jobs that fell well short of their abilities and
aspirations or remaining in a country which they felt oﬀered them few prospects for the future.
Mr Komorowski completely under-estimated this growing wave of frustration among younger voters who had
previously formed a key element of Civic Platform’s core electorate. Many of them supported the charismatic former
rock star Paweł Kukiz who, standing as an ‘anti-system’ candidate, secured more than one-ﬁfth of the votes in the
ﬁrst round of the election. Mr Komorowski’s ‘security’ message, that a period of on-going international tension was
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not a time to risk experiments with political novices, had greater potential appeal to voter concerns about instability
on Poland’s Eastern border, but as the Ukrainian conﬂict no longer dominated news headlines it was not a salient
campaign issue.
Mr Duda promised an active presidency
Mr Duda, on the other hand, ran an energetic and dynamic campaign that caught Mr Komorowski oﬀ-guard.
Focusing on meeting voters across the country and presenting a youthful and modern image, he was not a
stereotypical Law and Justice politician and had a much more open style and ability to connect with ordinary people.
In contrast to Mr Komorowski’s alleged aloofness and passivity, Mr Duda promised to be an active President who
would improve social dialogue.
His campaign focused primarily on socio-economic issues and included a large number of electoral promises that
were popular, but that went beyond the competencies of the presidency and were potentially extremely costly. These
included pledges to raise tax allowances signiﬁcantly and repeal the Civic Platform-led government’s extremely
unpopular pension reforms that increased the retirement age to 67, while the only notable revenue-raising measures
proposed were new taxes on banks and supermarkets.
More broadly, Mr Duda tapped into discontent with the political status quo and turned the election into a de facto
referendum on a government that many Poles had grown weary of after nearly eight years in oﬃce. He linked its
apparent inertia, which many commentators referred to dismissively as the politics of ‘warm water in the taps’, with
Mr Komorowski’s passive presidential style, attacking him for ignoring criticisms of the government and rubber-
stamping virtually all of its laws.
The ‘politics of fear’ did not work
It was only after the initial shock of Mr Komorowski’s unexpected ﬁrst round defeat – when, in spite of having been
well ahead in every poll during the campaign, he ﬁnished behind Mr Duda by 33.8 per cent to 34.8 per cent – that
the President tried to develop a more dynamic campaign and communicate with voters in a sharper, more engaging
way. This included, for example, preparing himself intensively for the two head-to-head TV candidate debates where
he adopted a much more combative (although not particularly consensual) style and, in the ﬁrst of these at least,
was able to catch Mr Duda out on a couple of occasions.
Belatedly, Mr Komorowski also tried to present himself as an active and responsive President by using the
instruments at his disposal to unveil a series of legislative initiatives. For example, in an eﬀort to win over Mr Kukiz’s
supporters he initiated a national referendum on introducing single-member electoral constituencies and abolishing
state party funding: two of the ‘anti-system’ challenger’s signature issues. He also proposed legislation allowing
Poles to retire after having worked for 40 years (which he withdrew immediately after polling day). However, Mr
Komorowski’s new initiatives were so disconnected from his previous campaign message, that he represented
continuity and stability, that they were widely dismissed as inauthentic, particularly given that as President he had
rejected earlier citizens’ initiatives that enjoyed widespread public backing.
In fact, the main pillar of Mr Komorowski’s second round campaign was an attempt to re-conceptualise another
earlier slogan which tried to draw a contrast between what he termed ‘rational’ and ‘radical’ Poland. Realising that
this appeared to dismiss a large proportion of the population as beyond the democratic pale, thereby contradicting
his claim to be the candidate of consensus and agreement, Mr Komorowski tried to re-frame this message by
drawing on his record as a veteran of Poland’s anti-communist opposition and presenting himself as the ‘President
of our freedom’ pitted against politicians like Mr Duda who, he claimed, wanted to interfere in and control ordinary
citizens’ private lives.
In part, this was simply an attempt to revive Civic Platform’s traditional anti-Law and Justice message: that the ruling
party is a better guarantor of stability than the confrontational and allegedly authoritarian style of politics that many
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voters (rightly or wrongly) associate with Law and Justice and its combative leader Jarosław Kaczyński. This theme
was a key element in all of the ruling party’s recent, successful election campaigns.
However, it also involved a conscious eﬀort to ‘toxify’ Mr Duda – whom Law and Justice tried to present as a
moderate and reasonable centrist – by, for example, highlighting his alleged radicalism on moral-cultural issues
where the public took a socially liberal stance such as in vitro fertilisation. The Komorowski campaign drew attention
to the fact that, in 2012, Mr Duda had supported a draft law that would have led to the imprisonment of doctors
involved in such procedures, a proposal that Law and Justice has since withdrawn. They also tried to claim that Mr
Kaczyński, who kept a very low proﬁle during the campaign, would attempt to steer Mr Duda from behind-the-
scenes.
Mr Komorowski’s strategy was based on the premise that a substantial number of his potential voters had abstained
in the ﬁrst round as a protest to show the government a ‘yellow card’, but could be persuaded to return to the fold
when faced with the prospect of a Law and Justice-backed candidate being elected President. The key to his
success was, therefore, felt to be in boosting turnout – which, at only 49 per cent in the ﬁrst round, was a record low
for a Polish presidential election – among his more reluctant supporters.
In fact, Mr Duda won in spite of the fact that turnout in the second round actually increased to 55.3 per cent, broadly
in line with the previous 2010 presidential poll. This questioned the previous received wisdom that Law and Justice
had a highly motivated, but limited core electorate, and that there was a ‘glass ceiling’ preventing its support from
rising above a certain level. Perhaps most dangerously for the ruling party, Mr Duda’s victory, therefore, suggests
that its previously, highly successful strategy of mobilising the passive anti-Law and Justice majority through
invoking the ‘politics of fear’ is no longer as eﬀective as it once was, particularly among a new generation who have
no (positive or negative) memories of the 2005-7 Law and Justice-led governments; Mr Duda secured 60 per cent
support among younger voters.
Civic Platform’s strategy in tatters?
The Polish presidency is not simply a ceremonial role and retains some important constitutional powers such as: the
right to initiate legislation, refer bills to the Constitutional Tribunal, nominate a number of key state oﬃcials, and,
perhaps most signiﬁcantly, a suspensive veto that requires a two-thirds parliamentary majority to over-turn.
However, the President’s competencies are much less signiﬁcant than those of, say, his French counterpart, and
real executive power lies with the Prime Minister. The presidential poll should, therefore, be seen above all as a
precursor to the more important autumn parliamentary election which will determine the shape of the Polish political
scene for several years to come.
Given the relatively short gap between the two elections, Mr Duda’s victory potentially changes the dynamics of the
parliamentary poll. A key element of Mrs Kopacz’s political strategy when she took over the premiership last autumn
was that a resounding victory for Mr Komorowski, preferably in the ﬁrst round, would create a wave of popular
enthusiasm that could help carry the ruling party through to a parliamentary election victory. Mr Duda’s success has
left this plan in tatters and beyond the (increasingly less eﬀective) tactic of invoking the politics of fear, Mrs Kopacz’s
plan for victory now appears to consist mainly of a series of voter-friendly social and welfare policies.
Moreover, although Mr Duda will not be sworn in as President until the beginning of August, he will still be basking in
a post-election glow of victory and could use the months between then and the parliamentary poll to smooth the way
for the opposition by introducing popular legislation that will be very diﬃcult for Civic Platform to reject, most likely
his two ﬂagship policies of lowering the retirement age and increasing tax allowances.
At the same time, while, up until now, Law and Justice appeared to have no obvious coalition partners among the
main parliamentary groupings – which meant that, even if it ‘won’ the election, Civic Platform could still end up
remaining in oﬃce – the possible entry into parliament of a substantial ‘anti-system’ right-wing bloc clustered around
Mr Kukiz could radically alter possible future coalition conﬁgurations, opening up a potential pathway to power for Mr
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Kaczyński’s party.
All to play for, but Law and Justice has the momentum
In fact, a lot can happen during the next ﬁve months and the election outcome remains open and unpredictable,
especially if Law and Justice falls into the trap of excessive triumphalism. Mr Komorowski’s defeat was a narrow one
and the ruling party still has large reservoirs of popular support that it can draw upon as well as the backing of most
of the cultural and media establishment. Moreover, the focus of Civic Platform’s negative campaigning will be Mr
Kaczyński who has much more political baggage than the fresh-faced Mr Duda.
However, it is clearly Law and Justice that has the momentum, while Mr Komorowski’s defeat could prompt in-
ﬁghting and recriminations in what is, beneath the surface, a deeply divided and factionalised ruling party. Above all,
Mr Duda has a much greater popular mandate than any Civic Platform politician and his ability to overcome the
‘politics of fear’ and apparently break through Law and Justice’s ‘glass ceiling’ of support has potentially very
considerable implications for the future of Polish politics.
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